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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 19-1421
_____________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
DARRYL THOS. AVERETT MITCHELL,
a/k/a Darryl Mitchell a/k/a Darryl Thomas Averett,
Appellant
_______________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 2-18-cr-00225-001)
District Judge: Hon. Mitchell S. Goldberg
_______________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
November 12, 2019
Before: JORDAN, SCIRICA, and RENDELL, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: November 27, 2019)
_______________
OPINION
_______________



This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7,
does not constitute binding precedent.

JORDAN, Circuit Judge.
Darryl Thomas Averett Mitchell, convicted of multiple federal crimes, appeals the
District Court’s application of a sentencing enhancement for obstruction of justice. We
will affirm.
I.

BACKGROUND
Mitchell had two Social Security numbers – one issued to him in the name “Darryl

Mitchell” when he was two years old, and the other in the name of “Darryl Thomas
Averett” when he was 16. When he applied for his second social security number,
Mitchell falsely stated that he had never applied for or received a social security number
before. Years later, using that second social security number, Mitchell committed
various crimes, including social security fraud, passport fraud, and student loan fraud. In
addition, he violated federal law by willfully failing to make court-ordered child support
payments. As charged in the indictment, he was in arrears in excess of $195,000.00 on
those payments as of March 2018.
On April 24, 2018, Mitchell was arrested pursuant to a complaint and warrant and
was held at the Federal Detention Center in Philadelphia, pending trial. While in
custody, Mitchell told his sister to attend a grand jury proceeding to prevent witnesses
from talking to each other. He instructed his sister to “regulate” the witnesses, to “keep
them moving[,]” and to ensure they were not talking to each other. (App. at 45-46.) He
also told her to contact one of the witnesses in advance, and he provided her with the
witness’s name, address, and phone number. Both Mitchell and his sister in fact did
communicate with that witness.
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Mitchell also instructed family members to contact women to whom he owed child
support in an effort to have them forgive his outstanding support debt. For example, he
told his brother to find out where one of the women lives and works, to visit her, and to
get her to forgive the past-due child support because “it appears to be part of their [i.e.,
the government’s] case[.]” (App. at 48.) He told his brother to use “ANY means
necessary[.]” (Id.) His brother and sister sent text messages and called one of the
women.
On May 24, 2018, a grand jury indicted Mitchell on four counts of social security
fraud, one count of passport fraud, two counts of willful failure to pay child support, and
three counts of student loan fraud. A few months later, Mitchell pled guilty to the
indictment in its entirety. At sentencing, the government and the Probation Office argued
that Mitchell’s base offense level under the guidelines should be enhanced pursuant to
U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 because of his attempts to tamper with grand jury witnesses. The
District Court agreed and, in calculating Mitchell’s sentencing range, applied that
obstruction-of-justice enhancement. Mitchell timely appealed.
II.

DISCUSSION1
Mitchell argues that the District Court erred in applying the obstruction-of-justice

sentencing enhancement because the government did not show that his conduct was
willful and capable of impeding the investigation or prosecution. We disagree.

1

The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742. “We review the factual
determinations underlying a sentence for clear error. A finding is clearly erroneous
when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing body on the entire evidence
3

Section 3C1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines provides:
If (1) the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to
obstruct or impede, the administration of justice with respect to the
investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense of
conviction, and (2) the obstructive conduct related to (A) the defendant’s
offense of conviction and any relevant conduct; or (B) a closely related
offense, increase the offense level by 2 levels.
U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 (emphasis omitted). “‘Willfully’ in this context means deliberately or
intentionally; in other words, not negligently, inadvertently, or accidentally.” United
States v. Douglas, 885 F.3d 145, 152 (3d Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The government bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the
enhancement applies. Id.
The District Court did not clearly err in concluding that Mitchell’s efforts to keep
grand jury witnesses from talking to each other was an attempt to obstruct the
government’s investigation. Mitchell argues that he was just trying to make sure that his
paramours did not find out about each other and that the sequestration of witnesses could
not impact the government’s investigation. But there was sufficient evidence for the
District Court to reject those arguments and conclude that his conduct amounted to

is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United
States v. Douglas, 885 F.3d 145, 150 n.3 (3d Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted). “[W]e review the District Court’s application of the Guidelines to
facts for abuse of discretion … .” United States v. Thung Van Huynh, 884 F.3d 160, 165
(3d Cir. 2018). “But where the Guidelines set[ ] forth a predominantly fact-driven test,
[the clear error and abuse of discretion] standards become indistinguishable, because we
would find that the Court had abused its discretion in applying the enhancement based on
a particular set of facts only if those facts were clearly erroneous.” Id. (alteration in
original) (internal quotation marks omitted). On this record, review for clear error is
appropriate.
4

obstruction. For example, Mitchell instructed his family to “regulate” the grand jury
witnesses, to “keep them moving[,]” and to ensure that they were not talking to each
other. (App. at 45-46.) It was not clearly erroneous for the District Court to conclude
that Mitchell was trying to influence the witnesses’ testimony before the grand jury.
Similarly, the District Court did not clearly err in determining that Mitchell’s
efforts to get the mothers of his children to forgive his arrearage in child support
payments was an attempt to obstruct the government’s case against him. He argues that
he was simply trying to work out his child support obligations and that the government’s
case would not have been affected had the women done as he asked. But again, there is
ample evidence in the record to support the District Court’s conclusion. For example,
Mitchell told his brother to seek out one of the women and get her to forgive the child
support debt because he was worried the existence of the debt was part of the
government’s case against him. And had the women forgiven his arrears, it could well
have affected the government’s ability to prove the charge of willful failure to pay child
support, as well as the amount of restitution Mitchell was ultimately ordered to pay.
III.

CONCLUSION
We discern no error in the District Court’s decision to apply the obstruction-of-

justice-sentencing enhancement, and so will affirm.
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